Write a database and a thesis statement for the following prompt: Turn in the database to me by Monday or Tuesday of next week and share the thesis as your comment.
Explain why and how the role of the federal government changed as a result of the Civil War with respect to TWO of the following during the period 1861-1877.
Race relations
economic development
westward expansion
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
New ID's for Unit 6 Exam
1. detente
2. Cuban Missile Crisis
3. Bay of Pigs invasion
4. 26th Amendment
5. Domino Theory
6. vietnamization
7. Hanoi Jane
8. military industrial complex
9. War Powers Act 1973
10. Tonkin Gulf Resolution
11. Tet Offensive
12. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
13. Henry Kissinger
14. Pentagon Papers
15. New York Times v. United States
2. Cuban Missile Crisis
3. Bay of Pigs invasion
4. 26th Amendment
5. Domino Theory
6. vietnamization
7. Hanoi Jane
8. military industrial complex
9. War Powers Act 1973
10. Tonkin Gulf Resolution
11. Tet Offensive
12. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
13. Henry Kissinger
14. Pentagon Papers
15. New York Times v. United States
Tuesday, March 11, 2008
"The Long Telegram"
The following reading is an excerpt from a document known as the "Long Telegram." George Kennan, foreign diplomat to Soviet Union, outlined the Soviet mindset and suggested a policy of containment to the Secretary of State and President Truman. After reading this excerpt answer the following questions.
1. How does Kennan think we should deal with the political force of the Soviet Union?
2. How does Kennan describe Soviet power?
3. How do we educate the public, according to Kennan?
4. What can the United States offer to the people of Europe, according to Kennan?
5. Define the word "containment" in your own words.
Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
1. How does Kennan think we should deal with the political force of the Soviet Union?
2. How does Kennan describe Soviet power?
3. How do we educate the public, according to Kennan?
4. What can the United States offer to the people of Europe, according to Kennan?
5. Define the word "containment" in your own words.
Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]
In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Unit 2 Review Assignment due 3/21!!!
Unit 2 Review Assignment (this assignment will help prepare you for the review portion on the test!)
Review Questions are going to focus on Chapters 13, 14, and 15 from the American Pageant and Chapters 8, 9,10 and 11 of the Review Book.
Sectionalism - Create a chart that highlights the key sectional issues facing the regions of the North, South, and West. Your chart must include information on how each section felt about tariffs, the National Bank, Land Policy, Native Americans, Slavery, and States’ Rights. Mr. Wise has a copy of the chart or you can make the chart on your own piece of paper.
Mass Democracy – Create a list of the major changes in politics from 1824-1840. Your list should help you answer the question: “Why is this time period considered the age of mass democracy?”
Immigration - Create a t-chart comparing Irish and German immigration. Your chart should include push/pull factors, major contributions, reaction/response.
The National Economy – Create a list of the major factors that contributed to the growth of a national economy by 1860. Include information on the westward movement, immigration, the factory system, commercial agriculture, and the transportation revolution.
Reform Movements, 1790-1860 – Create a list of the major reform movements up to 1860. Be sure to include their contributions to American culture and society and their lasting impact, if any.
Key topics that will show up on the review test: Erie Canal, cotton gin, “corrupt bargain”, spoils system, Jackson’s war on the Bank of the United States, Indian removal, the formation of the two-party system, Irish and German immigration, major transportation innovations, industrial workers before 1860, the sewing machine, temperance before 1860, Deists, Second Great Awakening and “camp meetings”, Second Great Awakening and the feminization of religion, public education before 1860, Dorothea Dix, Horace Mann, Brigham Young, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Utopian Communities, Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, transcendentalists.
Review Questions are going to focus on Chapters 13, 14, and 15 from the American Pageant and Chapters 8, 9,10 and 11 of the Review Book.
Sectionalism - Create a chart that highlights the key sectional issues facing the regions of the North, South, and West. Your chart must include information on how each section felt about tariffs, the National Bank, Land Policy, Native Americans, Slavery, and States’ Rights. Mr. Wise has a copy of the chart or you can make the chart on your own piece of paper.
Mass Democracy – Create a list of the major changes in politics from 1824-1840. Your list should help you answer the question: “Why is this time period considered the age of mass democracy?”
Immigration - Create a t-chart comparing Irish and German immigration. Your chart should include push/pull factors, major contributions, reaction/response.
The National Economy – Create a list of the major factors that contributed to the growth of a national economy by 1860. Include information on the westward movement, immigration, the factory system, commercial agriculture, and the transportation revolution.
Reform Movements, 1790-1860 – Create a list of the major reform movements up to 1860. Be sure to include their contributions to American culture and society and their lasting impact, if any.
Key topics that will show up on the review test: Erie Canal, cotton gin, “corrupt bargain”, spoils system, Jackson’s war on the Bank of the United States, Indian removal, the formation of the two-party system, Irish and German immigration, major transportation innovations, industrial workers before 1860, the sewing machine, temperance before 1860, Deists, Second Great Awakening and “camp meetings”, Second Great Awakening and the feminization of religion, public education before 1860, Dorothea Dix, Horace Mann, Brigham Young, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Utopian Communities, Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, transcendentalists.
Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Similarities and Differences Between The Wars
Create a list of similarities and differences between World War I and World War II. Include information on foreign policy and societal changes on the homefront.
Monday, February 25, 2008
Alphabet Soup
Analyze the successes and failures of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal Programs. Rank the top 10 most successful programs and the bottom 5 least successful. Write a paragraph summarizing the success of the New Deal. Write a paragraph summarizing the failure of the New Deal. Due Sunday 3/2 by 9pm!
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Unit 5 Study Guide (Unit 1 Stuff)
Unit 5 Study Guide
1. 1649 Maryland Act of Toleration
2. Origins of representative government and Puritan society
3. creation of the colony of Georgia
4. all the acts leading to revolution (sugar, stamp, tea, etc…)
5. Massachusetts and public education
6. All world wars leading up to the French and Indian war
7. survival of Jamestown colony
8. importance of the mayflower compact
9. James Oglethorpe, Cecil Calvert, Anne Hutchinson, William Penn, and Roger Williams (what colonies did they found and why)
10. Bacon’s Rebellion
11. Significance of the fundamental orders of Connecticut
12. purpose of mercantilism
13. navigation act in the 17th and 18th centuries
14. Zenger trial
15. Impact and significance of the Great Awakening
16. Accomplishments of Benjamin Franklin
17. Pontiac’s Rebellion
18. John Dickinson and “no taxation without representation”
19. Significance of Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense”
20. All results of the Treaty of Paris, 1783
21. Impact of French aid at the end of the American Revolution(could we have won without it?)
22. what is the British argument of “virtual representation?” how does it affect American colonial representation in parliament?
23. Halfway Covenant
24. founding of Harvard and Yale
FRQ Topics:
Roosevelt and the role of the federal government
Analyze success of Progressive Reform from 1890-1915
Sorry but the test bank for unit 5 is too big to put on the blog. I checked again and it is on the u-drive. If you come into my classroom at lunch I will let you print it out, or you can come to study session and gets access to it as well.
1. 1649 Maryland Act of Toleration
2. Origins of representative government and Puritan society
3. creation of the colony of Georgia
4. all the acts leading to revolution (sugar, stamp, tea, etc…)
5. Massachusetts and public education
6. All world wars leading up to the French and Indian war
7. survival of Jamestown colony
8. importance of the mayflower compact
9. James Oglethorpe, Cecil Calvert, Anne Hutchinson, William Penn, and Roger Williams (what colonies did they found and why)
10. Bacon’s Rebellion
11. Significance of the fundamental orders of Connecticut
12. purpose of mercantilism
13. navigation act in the 17th and 18th centuries
14. Zenger trial
15. Impact and significance of the Great Awakening
16. Accomplishments of Benjamin Franklin
17. Pontiac’s Rebellion
18. John Dickinson and “no taxation without representation”
19. Significance of Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense”
20. All results of the Treaty of Paris, 1783
21. Impact of French aid at the end of the American Revolution(could we have won without it?)
22. what is the British argument of “virtual representation?” how does it affect American colonial representation in parliament?
23. Halfway Covenant
24. founding of Harvard and Yale
FRQ Topics:
Roosevelt and the role of the federal government
Analyze success of Progressive Reform from 1890-1915
Sorry but the test bank for unit 5 is too big to put on the blog. I checked again and it is on the u-drive. If you come into my classroom at lunch I will let you print it out, or you can come to study session and gets access to it as well.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)